Institutional reforms to regulate the market environment and the proper functioning of democracy have been mandated by the European Union to accession countries. In spite of the uniform creation of such regulatory frameworks, governance problems persist, especially in the newest members of the EU. I analyze the institutional reform record in both market and political governance, as well as the effectiveness of these institutions, in the case of Romania, one of the laggards of reform. I argue that the EU did significantly support reform efforts, but insufficient domestic commitment to reform has resulted in ineffective institutions.
Introduction
Institutional reforms to regulate the market environment and the proper functioning of democracy have been mandated by the European Union to accession countries, resulting in the uniform creation of basic regulatory frameworks. These reforms include political governance (anti-corruption legislation, justice system reforms, public procurement and freedom of information laws), and economic governance (incorporation, contract law, corporate governance, bankruptcy, competition legislation). In spite of these advances, enduring corruption and conflicts of interest of politicians, as well as incomplete and cumbersome business regulations persist in the Eastern European members of the EU, most notoriously in the newest such members.
In spite of years of reform, Romania is the EU member with the most governance
problems. Comprehensive indicators from the World Bank show Romania faring worst among
Central and Eastern European countries in all years available and for all areas of governance, with the least impressive performances in rule of law and control of corruption (see Table 1 ). 1 These indicators are measured using surveys of firms and individuals, as well as the assessments of commercial risk rating agencies, non-governmental organizations, and a number of multilateral aid agencies (Kaufmann et al., 2006) . 2 These indicators measure electoral process, civil society, independent media, national and local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption. They are on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 the highest level of democratic progress. 2006 ratings are measured for 2005, and are based on country reports commissioned to local think tanks.
In economic terms, from 2000 to 2006 Romania has been the fastest growing EU economy, starting, however, from a low base; GDP per capita rose over the period by 30%, while inflation and unemployment dropped sharply (IMF, 2007) . In addition, in the Doing Business survey, the World Bank placed Romania second among countries that have improved their business environment the most in 2005. There were improvements in many areas, including dealing with licenses, employing workers, getting credit, protecting investors, trading across borders and closing a business (World Bank, 2006: 2) . The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) assessment of Romanian market institutions is mixed: the quality of insolvency and secured transactions laws is considered high, unlike in more advanced Eastern European countries like Poland or Slovenia, but there are still many problems, such as the low quality of the corporate governance law . Moreover, even in 2006, after much recent progress, Romania still placed last among EU members in many EBRD transition indicators, including the extent of privatization and restructuring, banking reform and competition policy (see Table 2 ).
The state of economic and political reforms suggests that while problems persist in all reform domains, economic governance is improving faster than political governance in Romania.
One of the aims of this paper is to look at these two institutional domains comparatively, both in terms of reform progress, and in terms of EU influence. However, the main task of this paper is
to assess to what extent EU conditionality has been an effective force in recent reform activity. It is hard to deny that the EU has significantly influenced the reform process in Romania, especially since the year 2000, when the accession negotiations started, and perhaps even more so in 2005 and 2006 , when the specific date of accession was uncertain. I look, however, at the effectiveness of this conditionality in terms of the quality of institutions created. I argue that the pace and shape of reforms since 2000 has followed domestic politics quite closely. While it appears that governments of all stripes have readily engaged in the reform activity promoted by the EU, I show that many reforms were passed strategically to appease EU concerns, but with no real impetus for reform. The institutions created in this way, while an improvement over the past, have many loopholes, are still ineffective, and their implementation is slow. These problems were more visible during the ex-communist Nastase government, though the present government's commitment to reform is also questionable. In order to tackle the questions I posed, I will detail the history of several market governance and political reform areas, and outline reform efforts and EU activity in each case. I start, however, with a review of existing arguments about EU influence on Eastern European institutional reforms.
Conditionality and integration: the literature
Many observers consider the opening of accession negotiations with Romania in 2000 as a rather fortuitous event for this country, caused mostly by the external circumstances of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, and by the need for stability in the region (Phinnemore, 2003; Gallagher, 2006) . Tom Gallagher, a long-time observer of Romanian politics, has expressed harsh criticism towards both Romanian politicians and the EU officials that pursued Romania's accession. He calls PSD (Social Democratic Party) politicians "a network of businessmen who mouth left-wing platitudes while systematically grabbing the most desirable economic plums for themselves in a chaotic lurch towards the free market", and notes that "a disastrously low-grade EU accession process has accentuated this political backwardness" (Gallagher, 2006: 2 Romania as "the consolidation of backwardness" (2006: 9-10).
There is some truth in Gallagher's assertion that many strategic sectors of the Romanian economy are dominated by EU banks and multinationals (e.g. banking and insurance, office buildings real estate, sugar, part of the energy sector) and that EU's political conditionality has sometimes taken a back seat to the pursuit of economic liberalization. In this paper, I do not address EU officials' motivations in the negotiation process; I look only at the effects of conditionality. However, it is exaggerated to say that the EU has shown "complete inability to export sustainable economical and social reforms, improved governance, and ultimately stability" (Gallagher, 2006: 10) to Romania.
Gallagher's pessimistic view about the EU's ability to promote democracy and good governance is a far cry from the conventional view in the literature. Vachudova (2002) , PopEleches (2007) and Ekiert et al. (2007) argue that it is precisely the meritocratic criteria set by the EU for enlargement that made the accession process so successful in promoting democracy in Eastern Europe. 4 This democracy export has been particularly important in those countries initially displaying a nationalist (as opposed to a liberal) model of politics (Vachudova, 2002; Pop-Eleches, 2007) . According to Vachudova, the threat of exclusion from the EU between 1995 and 1999, which she calls "active leverage", made "rent-seeking strategies of ethnic scapegoating and economic corruption less tenable, and contributed to the victory of opposition political parties that organized themselves around a pro-EU platform " (2002: 36 loss (Pridham, 2005; Pop-Eleches, 2007 (Grabbe, 2001 (Grabbe, : 1020 . Grabbe argues that gate-keeping is the most powerful, but also the most blunt conditionality instrument, and faults the other instruments for vagueness resulting in diffusion of influence. For instance, she notes the difficulties in pinpointing when the accession conditions have been met by the candidate countries, given that the Copenhagen criteria, unlike for instance IMF conditionality, are not a checklist of clear objectives or quantitative targets (Grabbe, 2003: 255) . At the core of EU conditionality are the highly debatable concepts of "democracy," "functional market economy" and "the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces", and even these broad aims are moving targets, with justice and home affairs, foreign and security policy and the common currency added as they develop inside the Union itself (Grabbe, 2003: 255-6) . The EU does not have formal rules on effective implementation or enforcement of reform policies, or specific tests of institutional change or compliance, which makes it hard to identify European influence on institutional change (Grabbe, 2001 (Grabbe, : 1024 .
Moreover, the EU's executive bias in the accession process, based on the notion that adopting EU norms is merely an administrative exercise, may result in the export of the EU's democratic deficit (Grabbe, 2003: 259; Pridham, 2005: 58) . Furthermore, the EU's own internal diversity makes it difficult to export a single model of good governance, and the conflicting demands arising often provide ammunition for different sides in domestic political battles (Grabbe, 2003; O'Dwyer, 2002; Pop, 2006 ). Grabbe's conclusion about the EU's role in promoting domestic reform is that the prospect of EU membership simply provides an anchor to the reform process (2003: 262) , and that it is difficult "to use EU membership conditionality as a scalpel to sculpt institutions and policies during the accession process; rather, it is a mallet that can be used only at certain points in the process to enforce a few conditions at a time" (Grabbe 2001 (Grabbe : 1026 Integration of Eastern European political regimes and economies also happens at a broader level, beyond specific conditions determined by the EU (Pridham, 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005) . Pridham (2005) adopts this broader approach to EU influence, emphasizing the dynamic interaction between the "pull" (democracy promotion, e.g. through political dialogue) and "push" (political conditionality) factors. According to Pridham (2005: 15-9) , integration theory teaches three main lessons pertinent to enlargement and democratic conditionality. The first lesson is that the EU, as a political system rather than a state, functions through diffused decision-making (multilevel governance), with imperfect separation between domestic and international politics. Second, integration theories teach us not to ignore informal integration, and third, they emphasize the contributions of both elites and masses to integration, and the interaction of these contributions through elite learning. Pridham (2005:228) brings to the discussion of EU influence a useful distinction between democratic transition and consolidation, noting that EU conditionality is only effective as a mechanism for promotion of democratic consolidation, after the initial transition phases have been secured. This consolidation phase consists in the institutionalization and deepening of new democratic rules, the main concern of this paper, as well as in the transformation of political culture to internalize democratic rules. Finally, Pridham makes the important point that the moment of EU entry is not final for democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe, in spite of Brussels' proclamation that the accession candidate is ready to take on the obligations of membership into the union. Instead, "the final big test of this conditionality…remains ahead" because it is not clear what happens to democratic consolidation when disillusionment sets in and conditionality ceases (Pridham, 2005: 229) .
Most of the literature on the effects of enlargement on democratic consolidation and economic reforms in Eastern Europe presents a basically optimistic view of this process, even when discussing various shortcomings of the mechanisms the EU uses to affect change. In part, this optimism is a side-effect of the focus on international dimensions of democracy. By centering on the difference between the EU's ability to influence democratization and that of other international organizations (Ekiert et al. 2007; Dimitrova and Pridham, 2004) , these works tend to overemphasize the effectiveness of this influence. While most of these accounts still attest to the importance of domestic politics (Pridham, 2005; Grabbe, 2003; Pop, 2006) , they do not tell us how the lack of political will can derail the process of reform when this process is constrained by EU pressures. 8 My paper attempts to fill this gap by investigating where we can see the effects of the lack of political will and how institutional outcomes are shaped by domestic politicians' weak commitment to reform. Some previous literature does note that there is a difference between the passage of legislation and its effective implementation; for instance, Pridham (2005: 138) points out that Romania "has a reputation in EU circles for producing finesounding documents that remain on paper", but so far there is little investigation of opportunities to avoid reforms at different points in the policy process other than the passage of legislation.
When implementation problems are noted, they are usually attributed to lack of trained staff or more broadly lack of administrative capacity. I bring attention to the idea that lack of political will prevents reform not just by opposition to the passage of legislation, but also through adoption of contradictory or weak enforcement and monitoring procedures for various institutions, through purposeful lack of coordination among complementary reforms, and through the maintenance of regulatory institutions under political control, so that implementation of laws remains dependent on political configurations.
Studies emphasizing the external influences on the Eastern European transformation are far from representing the only line of research, or even the majority of research on the causes of postcommunist reforms. There is a vast literature on domestic causes of reform that emphasizes causes ranging from legacies of communist rule (e.g. Ekiert and Hanson, 2003; Stark and Bruszt, 1997; Roeder 1999) to various aspects of political competition (e.g. Frye, 2002; Grzymalla-Busse, 2006; Fish, 1998) . This type of arguments downplays the role of EU conditionality in the adoption of governance institutions by highlighting the significant variation in the extent of reforms among countries that have been under similar pressure from the EU (e.g. GrzymallaBusse, 2006) . In my discussion of domestic politics I cannot engage at length with any of these arguments. Rather, I focus on the interaction between domestic politics and EU demands.
EU influence on reform
The Commission, however, clearly indicated that there is a lot left to do, including achieving a fully consistent interpretation and application of the law, and establishing an integrity agency that would verify assets, incompatibilities and potential conflicts of interest of public officials, and that would issue mandatory decisions in this respect. The Monitoring Report also cautions:
"there needs to be a clear political will to demonstrate the sustainability and irreversibility of the recent positive progress in fighting corruption. In the Parliament there have been some attempts to substantially reduce the effectiveness of such efforts" (EC, 2006b: 5).
Both Bulgaria and Romania are to report regularly on progress regarding specific benchmarks even after accession, with the first report to be submitted by March 31, 2007 . In this first post-accession report, the EU notes yet more progress in judicial system and anti-corruption reforms, but declares that sensitive points remain, in particular deploring the still missing (at the time) adoption of the Agency for National Integrity (ANI) law (EUbusiness, 2007) .
Domestic politics
Not all the missteps of the reform process can be blamed on political opposition. Some difficulties arise due to the unavailability of skilled civil servants to draft good legislation, to the lack of state capacity to implement it, and to the mixed signals coming from EU advisors, each promoting the legal tradition of their own country, rather than a unified EU framework (Freedom House, 2006: 19) . However, I show that political opposition to reform has strongly impacted progress. Such opposition has been significant both during the leftist PSD government of [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] , an during the center-right government that followed.
While there has been alternation in power of the two main political camps, the centerright and the center-left since 1996, the Freedom House 2003 country report considered meaningful and constructive political opposition t be absent, and deplored the fragmentation of the opposition and the large-scale political migration of local officials from the opposition to the ruling party. At the time, the communist-successor party, the center-left PSD (Social Democrat Party) was in power, after significantly increasing its vote and seat share in the 2000 elections to 36.6% of votes and 45% of seats, while the center-right alliance that had formed the previous government did not even make it to Parliament. 9 The Freedom House (2003) President Basescu, who appears to lead anti-corruption efforts, is also accused of being embroiled in shady business schemes, and there is a corruption file against him. The president has made little progress in reforming the secret service, although this lies clearly within his authority, and has integrated the many information services into a single "community of information" which causes much concern, given the fear that former members of the Securitate, the communist secret police, are infiltrating Parliament, government, and even the media What code ends up being adopted will be very important, because it will determine the effectiveness of anti-corruption prosecution.
The battle over the National Agency for Integrity (ANI), an institution supposed to verify and enforce public officials' wealth declarations, is most telling for the means of political opposition to reform in the presence of EU pressure. Macovei's legislative proposal for this Agency was adopted by the House in October 2006, after many months of debate. Nonetheless, the form of the adopted law had been significantly changed from the original proposal,
prompting Minister Macovei to complain that this law has been significantly diluted, because it left out conflicts of interest of the MPs, and it subordinated ANI politically (Realitatea TV 2007) .
The draft legislation for this agency was then sent for adoption to the Senate in March 2007.
Given the apparent anti-reform turn of the government after the reshuffle, it was unlikely that the law would ever be adopted, but 'the miracle' happened on May 9, 2007. The final version of the law, however, is considered weak, 10 in spite of changes introduced by the new Justice Minster.
The new institution is politically subordinated to the Senate, and does not have a mandate to verify conflicts of interest (Pirvu and Blagu, 2007) .
10 Transparency International's (2007) position on this law is somewhat contradictory: on the one hand, they salute the passage of the law, consider it to be in accordance to basic anti-corruption principles, and express hope that it will be implemented properly; on the other hand, they acknowledge political subordination and the agency's inability to investigate conflicts of interest.
Assessment of political governance reforms

One important problem of the institutional environment for the fight against corruption in
Romania is the presence of loopholes in the laws comprising this environment. 11 This prevents much-anticipated and well-sounding laws from having the expected effects. The 2000 anticorruption law, for instance, was a welcome milestone, but it failed to distinguish between petty and more serious corruption, often leading to excessively harsh punishments for petty corruption and too lenient ones for grand corruption. Similarly, the 2002 law on public procurement introduced electronic procurement procedures, which made the process more transparent, but did not establish an independent body to supervise the operation; several newspapers charged that most winning bidders were companies close to the ruling party (Freedom House, 2003) .
Another main problem leading to the ineffectiveness of democratic governance is the The GRECO report notes that a public prosecutor often deals with 50 cases simultaneously and a judge deals with at least 80 cases per hearing (GRECO, 2005: 6) . 13 For instance, the minister of Transport was accused of disbursing county funds without clear criteria, and lost his job amid public outcry, but the NAPO investigation only started after the change in government in 2004.
interference also remains an important factor in recruitment and promotion of civil servants in spite of the reasonably developed legal framework (Freedom House, 2003) .
The Open Society Institute's evaluation of Romanian anti-corruption policies (OSI, 2002) makes observations similar to those of the GRECO and Freedom House Reports. The national anti-corruption strategy and the changes to the public procurement system are noted as important improvements, but the focus on low-level corruption and the refusal to prosecute members of the political establishment in power are presented as major flaws.
Attempts to entrench political power were not limited to keeping institutions politically dependent. Some of the policies adopted by the PSD government, while appearing to improve the formal independence of the justice system, had the opposite effect. The most notable example supposed to eliminate these weaknesses (the National Integrity Agency) has been passed. On political independence of anti-corruption institutions there is a mixed record; presently, the top anti-corruption prosecutor is considered relatively politically independent, due to its ability to prosecute members of the parties in power. It is not clear, however, how long this independence can be maintained 15 . The National Integrity Agency, the newest institution of the anti-corruption framework, is also politically subordinated to Parliament. Thus, politicians opposed to reform have found ways, through the various mechanisms presented above, to protect the weak status quo of democratic governance even while passing the EU-required laws.
Assessment of market governance reforms
The second question I investigate in this paper is whether there were any differences between EU conditionality in different types of reforms, namely between political and market governance reforms. Given the origins of the EU as a primarily economic organization, we might expect that it is most concerned with the market environment, which could mean stronger conditionality in this field. At the same time, the EU is not the only international organization providing economic policy advice and conditions to Romania. Also, market governance reforms may not be as controversial as political governance reforms, because politicians are not threatened directly by these changes.
The main economic concerns voiced by the Commission in 2005 were state aid, enforcement of bankruptcy decisions, and privatization and restructuring. These were indeed main areas of reform in the period under study, and while there is still much room for improvement, these reforms do not appear to have suffered from the same political interference as the political governance reforms.
Competition policy
Competition policy seems to be a field where the EU has recently been very firm. By making Commission approval necessary for the disbursement of state aid, the December 2006 amendments to competition law were a vehicle for bringing about significant change in the government's way of doing business in one of the traditional areas for corruption and state capture, namely state subsidies.
Competition law was first enacted in March 1996. This law came much later than the equivalent laws in Central European countries and even in Russia, but at the time, the vast majority of Romanian industrial production still came from state-owned enterprises. The desire to eventually become part of the European Union was reflected in the fact that this law was modeled on articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome (Pittman, 1997: 164) . The political debate around the law was about the independence of the institution to be created for enforcement of 16 However, the state aid area of competition policy was still one of concern for the Commission. Enforcement was still hampered by the poor quality of the Council's pre-notifications (EC, 2005: 87) , though the quality of these decisions was improving.
Recovery of state aid ruled to be illegal had also not yet started.
The Commission is particularly interested in the steel industry, and is monitoring the implementation of the National Steel Restructuring Strategy, focusing on the government's commitment not to grant any further state aid to the sector. Some of the firmest language of the Commission, and an alternation of accusatory and encouraging language, is used with respect to this sector. On one hand, the Commission states that Romania "shows a strong commitment to apply fully the State aid rules as regards the steel industry" and "a fulfillment of the accession treaty obligations is likely" (EC, 2005: 90) . On the other hand, the Commission notes that some steel companies not included in the National Restructuring Programme (and therefore not monitored by the competition Council) "appear to have benefited from restructuring aid although these companies were not allowed to receive such aid" (EC, 2005: 90) . This aid amounts to the write-off of historical debts during privatization, a common strategy meant to make privatizing companies sellable. Where the existence of such aid can be confirmed, the Commission requests that "the aid will have to be recovered with interest" (EC, 2005: 89) . To further investigate the issue, the Commission asked Romania to submit detailed information about the privatization of companies not included in the national steel restructuring strategy, and complained that "the information submitted by Romania so far in this context is incomplete" (EC, 2005: 89) .
In December 2006, the Competition Council got a large boost from the Commission, which made it the liaison between the Commission and the government on the issue of state aid.
The Council has to be notified of all state aid prior to disbursement of funds, and give preapproval for such aid, after consulting the EU Commission. This probably makes the Competition Council the most autonomous institution of market governance in Romania. The
Council achieved this position thanks entirely to the EU Commission's specific concern with state aid; this makes competition policy an area of governance strongly influenced by the EU.
Commercial legislation
In terms improve contractual enforcement, by imposing fines to encourage debtors (including state-owned enterprises) to pay on time, but in practice these fines are not applied (EC, 2005: 67) .
Privatization law was also reformed in 2002 (137/2002) , but the main problems, lack of transparency of the agencies implementing privatization, and the difficulty for buyers of obtaining information about the companies to be privatized without bribing the privatization agency officials, have not been solved (EC, 2005: 70) . Some of the problems with privatization, however, are not related to the law; rather, non-achievement of contractual obligations of new owners sometimes leads to the bounce back to state ownership, slowing the pace of privatization (EC, 2005: 58) .
It is also worth noting that unlike company law and competition policy, some issues of market governance, such as corporate governance and bankruptcy, do not have their own chapters in accession negotiations and monitoring reports, and thus received less attention during the negotiation process. EU advice in these areas in the annual reports has been limited to noting that both enforcement and legal provisions require further improvement (EC, 2005: 4) . However, these fields of law display the same combination of relatively developed legal framework and ineffective implementation as EU-monitored laws. The EBRD mentions, for instance, that the effectiveness of minority shareholders' rights provisions is "well below what could be expected in terms of prevailing legislation" (Cigna and Enriques, 2005: 30) . Bankruptcy Law presents a similar picture. While Freedom House (2005) considers bankruptcy legislation as still being a major problem area, especially due to permissive reorganization provisions, the EBRD considers the Romanian Insolvency law one of the leading such laws in EBRD's countries of operation and highly compliant with international standards (EBRD, 2006: 13) . The whole Eastern European region has experienced an explosion of reforms in the fields of creditor and shareholder rights, leading to highly developed legislation by 1998 (Pistor et al., 2000) . However, Pistor et al. (2000) note that across the region, law on the books does not correlate with legal effectiveness, which negatively affects the availability of external finance. The EBRD (2006: 15) also notes, in the case of the Romanian bankruptcy law that a large gap exists between the quality of the law and the insolvency regime in practice.
The similarities between the state of reforms in market regulation areas that are specific EU concerns and those that are not suggests that it might be difficult to distinguish the EU's impact in market governance from the more diffuse international influence coming from other organizations, such as the EBRD or the IMF, and from foreign legal consultants. Imitation of the Western market governance framework sometimes almost word by word in hopes of attracting foreign capital may be what drove market governance reforms independently of EU accession negotiations. Such law transplants, however, have resulted in a disconnect between the law on the books and the law in practice, so that even good laws on paper have not had the expected effects in terms of attracting foreign finance (Pistor et al., 2000) .
The remaining problems with commercial legislation point to the close relationship between political and market governance reforms. If anti-corruption policies were effective, and if the rule of law and the court system were strengthened, many of the problems with market regulations would disappear. Thus, in spite of the more continuous pace of market governance reforms -many reforms were passed in the middle of the PSD term, and reform activity was more evenly distributed over the electoral cycle -the problems of corruption and unreformed judiciary are replicated in the market environment, where they impair the efficiency of otherwise relatively well-written market governance laws.
Conclusion
The EU's influence on Romanian reforms has been extensive, due to this organization's ability to credibly promise much higher and more tangible benefits that any other international organization, as well as to the EU's specific and credible conditionality. However, even in this most-likely case scenario for international influence, I have shown that there is still room for domestic politicians to subvert specific reforms. I have highlighted the ways in which EU influence can be undermined by studying the effects of lack of political will on governance reforms mandated by the EU. Against the unqualified argument that the EU has successfully promoted democratic governance in Romania, I have argued that many legislated reforms have yet to be effective. The main ways in which politicians have been able to subvert these reforms have to do with the quality and effectiveness of legislation, and not just with its passage. New
Romanian institutions of democratic governance are often not politically independent, have weak operational capacity (low budgets), and lack coordination with other laws. While the pattern of law adoption follows the EU membership negotiations closely, the problems mentioned suggest that conditionality has not fully achieved its purpose, effecting legal changes more than real changes. In other words, when conditionality is strongest, opposition to reform 'mutates' from affecting the timing of reform to influencing the effectiveness of the adopted rules. Effectiveness In terms of market governance reforms, the pace of change has been more even, and the EU's influence has been compounded by other international organizations, and by the government's desire to attract foreign investment. However, inefficient firms connected to politicians still have plenty of opportunities to navigate the market environment, due to both imperfect legislation and ineffectiveness of market governance laws.
Domestic politics and international influence are not starkly opposed concepts, but rather interact in many ways in the transition process in Eastern Europe, and have to be analyzed together. One of the few attempts to truly combine these two types of influence analytically in the discussion of reform outcome comes from Jacoby (2006) . He points out that international actors change domestic politics in three ways: by lengthening the time horizons of postcommunist politicians, by making more domestic actors interested in reform, and by deterring the opponents to reform (Jacoby, 2006: 625) . The best way for external actors to achieve any of these objectives, Jacoby argues, is to build informal coalitions with domestic actors, rather than attempting to coerce change by substituting domestic politics (e.g. as in the management of Bosnia), or by simply aiming to inspire domestic politicians. Because coalitionbuilding is the most effective strategy, studies discussing international influence should focus on the extent to which this strategy is followed. Jacoby does not suggest that these coalitions are always successful in producing the desired change, just that they are more successful than alternative courses of action. This useful research agenda would benefit also from distinguishing the factors that make domestic-international actor alliances successful. In the Romanian case, further research on the specifics of the EU-Romanian government relationship starting in 2000
would be very helpful in shedding light on why this coalition has not been as successful as it could have been.
Politicians' strategies aimed at preserving their advantages and avoiding real change may not be sufficient to prevent incremental change, and may only succeed in slowing down the process of adoption of Western standards of democracy. However, the danger is that these strategies could also result in equilibrium of partial governance reforms, not at the most visible level of institutional adoption, but at the more intimate level of institutional functioning and coordination. Institutions are not the only important aspect of a consolidated democracy, but their ability to stabilize actors' expectations is a key part of democratic consolidation. Therefore, strengthening the effective functioning of these institutions is an important challenge for Romanian democratic development. 
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